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Nine years ago I distributed, or thought that I distributed, all
cases of so-called "waiver" among the four departments, Election,
Estoppel, Contract, and Release. The book' having been warmly
approved by the reviewers, I sat back complacently awaiting au-
reoles from the benches, and LL.D's. from the universities. But
nothing h.ppened. And now, in YALE LAW JOURNAL for June
last,2 Professor W. R. Vance picks me up and bounces me about
as though I had contributed little in my "amusing book" beyond
the framing of a few facetiae of very qualified quality. It is sad.
Waiver or Election? The Professor's special subject is the law
of insurance, in which waiver has frolicked and masqueraded (the
words are right) profusely, confusedly, and unrestrainedly for
many years. In very truth, the vast majority of insurance cases
which have been sacrificed on the altar of "waiver" were in reality
not cases of waiver at all, but of election. And for this the law-
yers were chiefly to blame, for the issue which they constantly
presented to the courts was, waiver or no waiver. In the multi-
tudinous actions for loss, the insurance company pleaded (1) that
the policy contained a proviso that (for example) if coal-oil were
brought upon the premises the policy should be void; and (2)
that coal-oil was brought upon the premises. To this the plaintiff
replied that the company waived the proviso. But the lawyers
and the courts did not observe that the plea was wrong. The
word "void" in the policy meant voidable at the election of the
company,' and the plea ought, therefore, to have been (1) the
policy contained a proviso that if coal-oil were brought upon the
premises the company might elect to terminate the policy; (2)
coal-oil was brought upon the premises; and (3) the company
elected to terminate. Obviously, without this third allegation the
plea was bad.
And observe that the very important effects of this substitu-
tion of election for waiver are (1) that the issue is not waiver or
no waiver, but election or no election; and (2) that instead of the
onus of proving waiver being on the plaintiff (difficult to dis-
charge even when aided by the sympathy of the court), it is on
the company to prove an election which probably never existed.
I Ewart, Waiver Distributed among the Departments Election, Estoppel,
Contract and Release (1917), with a foreword by Roscoe Pound, Ph.D.,
LL.D. Harvard University Press.
2Vance, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law (1925) 34 YALE LAW
JOURNiAL, 834.
3 To that, Prof. Vance assents. Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 851.
[970]
WAIVER
I judge that Professor Vance has not escaped the general mistake
to which I have alluded, for, in his book, he refers to scores of
cases in which the pleadings were as I have indicated (including
the much discussed case of Northern Assurance Co. v. Graid Viw
Building Assoclatioo), and he makes no objection to the way in
which the issues were presented.0
Forfeiture. Another fundamental mistake into which the
courts and the insurance writers (including Professor Vance)
have fallen is their misuse of the word forfeiture. By a breach
of a condition in a policy, the writers and the courts say that the
policy is forfeited. But that is a mistake. Notwithstanding the
breach, the policy remains intact and effective in every respect
as before, including the obligation of the company to pay. AU
that has happened is that the company has acquired a right to
elect between continuing and terminating the policy. And the
Professor went far astray when, speaking generally, he said in his
book, that,7
"the condition of forfeiture in the contract of insurance is self-
operative; upon breach of the condition the rights of the insured
are terminated ipso facto."
Much improving upon his book, the Professor, in his article,
agrees that default does not cause "the extinguishment of the
legal relations of the parties," and that the effect of default is that
the company acquires power to extinguish the contract. But he
adds the curious statement that,"
CC'waiver' more adequately describes what really takes place than
does the word 'election,' for the insurer's only election is between
exercising his power of rescission and waiving it."
Waiver is better than election because it is election-"the insur-
er's only election,"-that is the operating agency. Not a very
convincing reason! The election lies between continuing the
policy and terminating it; or (if it be better) between exercising
the power to terminate and not exercising it. For there is cer-
tainly no waiver, no relinquishment of the power by its non-exer-
cise, unless indeed, as concession to the insurance men, we were
to agree that when, negatively, we do not want to do something
and do not do it, we, positively, waive our right to do it.
Father-Bobby, you may have a second piece of pie.
Son-I don't want it.
4 (1902) 183 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct. 133.
r A sentence of the Professor's article leads to the same conclusion.
Vance, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 841.
6 Vance, Handbook of the Law of 12.surance (1904) 213-6 and Vasim.
7Ibid. at 218. There are rare occasions when the word "void" in a
policy means ipso facto void. It was not to such cases that this quotation
was intended to apply.
8 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 848.
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Father-You ought to say "I waive the pie," or "I relinquish
my privilege to have a second piece of pie."
Son-Naw, I don't want it.
Perhaps Bobby was right.
Election plus Waiver. Loyally adhering to waiver, the Pro-
fessor insists upon introducing it even when he has to admit the
sufficiency of election. I said in my book,"
"If you had a choice between a horse and a mule, and you chose
the horse, you would not say that you 'waived' the mule. For you
did not. You had an election between two animals, and, electing
to take one, you could do nothing with reference to the other."
While granting me election, the Professor insists upon a super-
erogatory waiver as well. He says :10
"If Mr. Ewart should elect to take the mule, one might ac-
curately enough say he had waived his privilege to take the horse."
The idea appears to be that in such cases there are two privileges
-two of this very peculiar sort:
"(1) You may have one of these animals and take him away
with you; and (2) you may have the other, but you must not take
him away. You must waive him."
To me that has the appearance of being only one privilege-a
privilege to choose. If I had two real privileges, I could take
both animals. I had only one. I exercised it. I did not waive
it, or any part of it.
Eleven Supposititious Cases. In my book I asked for some
intelligible definition of "waiver," for some idea of what it is, and
for the rules under which it operates. Professor Vance does not
help me. He adheres to,".
"the generally accepted definition of a waiver, 'an intentional
relinquishment of a known right.'"
But, after formulating eleven supposititious cases, all coming
"roughly," he says (I do not like "roughly"), within the defini-
tion, he tells us that,'2
"differentiating legal relations cast them into several quite dis-
tinct classes,.which for convenience we will designate (I) substi-
tute agreements, (II) proper waivers, (III) assumption of ex-
cepted risk, (IV) removal of condition upon acceptance, (V)
denial of liability, (VI) election."
I proposed to empty the waiver category by placing all its sup-
posed cases in four others. The Professor, on the other hand,
retains waiver, gives us six categories of it, and calls one of them
"proper waivers"-the others, I suppose, being improper. More
9 Ewart, op. cit. supra note 1, at 7.
10 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 845, note.
12 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2,'at 846.
12 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 846.
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startling still, he tells us that in Professor Williston's book on
Contracts,13
"are listed no fewer than nine legal relationships to which the
term waiver is indifferently applied." 14
Evidently, either we have no waiver at all, or we have it in mul-
tiple and very complex forms. And, this way or that, there ap-
pears to be little truth in the statement that waiver is such a
simple thing as "an intentional relinquishment of a known right."
To those who hold that it is a living, actuating concept, I repeat
my request for definition and rules. If we expect that examina-
tion of the eleven cases will throw some light upon the subject,
we shall be disappointed. Not one of them is a case of "waiver:'
They go off, very easily, into contract and election.
Cases 1, 2, aiad 3. Calling his first three cases "substitute
agreements," the Professor naturally declares that's "these three
'waivers' are but modifying contracts"-two of them unsupported
by admissible evidence. But why should anybody speak of a
"substitute agreement"V-a new contract varying an old one-as
a waiver? The idea seems to be that when the parties made the
new contract, they waived their right to remain as they were,
just as when they made the original contract, they waived their
right not to make it. When you go down town, you waive your
right to remain at home. Choose the horse and waive the mule!
I suppose one could get used to it. The first three cases are cases
of contract.
Case 4 is as follows:"' "Jones, having such a policy"-one
with an anti-military clause in it-"serves in the army without
injury and is discharged. He informs the agent of these facts,
and tenders the next accruing premium. The agent accepts the
piemium saying that while the policy had been forfeited the com-
pany will waive the forfeiture."
In explanation, the Professor says that "the agreement,"
"accomplishes merely the relinquishment of the insurer's privilege
to set up an otherwise perfectly valid defense in any action on the
policy. This may very properly be called a waiver."
But why call an "agreement" a "waiver"? Into the use of the
word the Professor was misled by his forgetfulness of what he
had said (as above quoted) about forfelturc. As already e:-
plained, there was no forfeiture. All that had happened was that,
because of the breach of condition, the company had acquired a
right to elect between continuing the policy and terminating
it. Acceptance of the premium evidenced an election to continue,
and there was no more to be said. On a later page the Pro-
1 2 Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 679.
' Vance, op. cit. supre, note 2, at S41, note.
"Vance, op. cit. szpra note 2, at 847.
'c Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 842.
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fessor offers a different, and quite inconsistent, solution of this
case 4. He says :17
"the waiver . . . . operates as a kind [What kind?] of
release of a privilege of defense. .
There was no release of any kind. If there was an "agreement,"
the case would be one of contract. And if there was no "agree-
ment" (the Professor seems to be uncertain about it), the case
would be one of election.
Case 51, is one of a policy, " 'void' in its inception because
he has other insurance on the building covered. Subsequently
the insurer, being informed of the breach of condition, expressly
excuses it and accepts payment of a deferred premium."
In explanation, the Professor says that the policy,
"is voidable at the option of the insurer, not of the insured; that
is, the insurer has the power to avoid the entire contract if he so
elects." And the conclusion is, that "it is this power which he
subsequently waives."
That is exactly what he does not do. Having an "option," he
exercises it by electing to continue the policy. The case is one of
election.
Case 6. "Jones, having a life policy containing the anti-
military clause, enlists without the consent of the insurer, but is
shortly afterwards discharged with health unimpaired. The
agent of the insurer thereupon writes him a letter stating that
the company takes pleasure in reinstating his forfeited policy.
Jones then dies before paying another premium, or doing any
other act in reliance upon the letter of reinstatement. The insurer
has extinguished his privilege to set up the breach of condition." 12
The insurer extinguished nothing. Having a right to elect be-
tween continuing and terminating, he exercised that right by
electing to continue. And the Professor's slip back into "forfeited
policy" partially accounts for his mistake.
The Professor's distinction between "waivers" and "proper
waivers" is new and interesting. Referring to cases 4 to 7,
he says that,20
"in each the insurer has expressed an intention not to assert an
otherwise perfectly good existing defense, and has expressly or
impliedly promised not to do so. In the first two cases of the
group this promise or 'waiver' rests upon a consideration, the
payment of a premium not otherwise due, but in the other two
no consideration for the promise can be found. Hence we may
say that the waiver in the first two of these cases operates as a
kind of release of a privilege of defense, but the waiver in the
other two cases cannot be so described, as a release not under
seal is inoperative in the absence of a consideration. Therefore
this second group of cases may be called proper waivers, since
there is no other term that is adequately descriptive."
37 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 847.
is Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 843.
19 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 843 and 844.
20 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 847.
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In other words, where there is a consideration for an implied
promise (sounds like a contract), there is a "waiver" which
".operates as a kind of release"-all very difficult to follow. But
where there is no consideration, there can be no operative release,
and cases of that kind must be called, "proper waivers, since
there is no other term that is adequately descriptive."
They are cases of election.
Case 7 is sufficiently identical with 6 to make comment
unnecessary. It is a clear case of election.
Case 8 may be passed, there being in it no suggestion of
waiver.
Case 9. "The insurance company's agent tenders to Jones
a life policy containing a stipulation that it shall not take effect
until actually delivered to the insured while he is in good health
and the first premium is actually paid in cash. Jones ex-plains
that he has not the ready money, and offers to give his note at
three months for the premium. The agent accepts the note and
delivers the policy. Jones dies within the three months. Is the
insurer under a duty to pay?" 21
The Professor properly, if I may say so, points out that the
stipulation is not a qualification of, or a limitation upon, the com-
pany's liability to pay, but a stipulation applicable only to the
creation of the contract.
"The question," he says, "involves the making of the contract,
not the operation of a contract already made. The cases rightly
hold that the insurer may 'waive' this condition, and that such
waiver may be shown by parol." 22
The first sentence is right. The second, as I think, is wrong.
The company offers to make a contract if the insured pays the
first premium in cash. The insured counters with "an offer" to
give a note instead of cash. "The agent accepts the offer." That
sort of thing often happens. Of course, when you accept a
counter-offer, you may, if you are a waiver-devotee, say that you
waive yours. Just as when a man signs a note, you may, if you
choose, declare that he has estopped himself from denying that
he has signed it. But I venture to offer a plea for something a
little more scientific than such distortions. The case is one of
contract.
Case 10. "Jones' fire policy contains a provision that no
action shall be brought thereon unless satisfactory proofs of loss
are furnished within sixty days after the fire. Immediately after
a fire, Jones applies for forms on which to make his proofs of
loss, but is told by the insurer that such proofs are not required,
all liability under the policy being denied because of breach of the
condition against other insurance. Almost without dissent the
courts hold that such denial of liability is a 'waiver' of the in-
surer's privilege to require proofs of loss." -
2'Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 844.
22 Vance, op. cit supra note 2, at 845.
23 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 845.
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The company's reason for not requiring delivery of proofs
being immaterial, it may be omitted. The case, then, is simply that
the company said to the insured that "proofs are not required"
as a prerequisite of action, and when action was brought, the
company pleaded that proofs were not furnished. So far from
the case being one of waiver, the Professor himself, on a later
page, disposes of the idea in this way :24
"Here the term 'waiver' is used to describe the operation of that
long settled rule of law and good sense that when one party to a
contract has made the performance of conditions required of the
other either impossible or unnecessary, the latter is excused from
performance."
After dealing with a contrary suggestion, the Professor adds that,
"the excuse for the insured's failure to perform is sufficiently clear
under the general rule stated above, and there is no need to invoke
the doctrine of waiver or to seek a consideration."
The case is one of contract.
Case 11. "The policy may give to the insurer the privilege
of electing between two alternative duties, such as payment or
replacement in case of property loss, as stated in case (11). Here
it is usually said that by electing to do either one the insurer
'waives his right' to do the other. It would perhaps be more ac-
curate to say that the insurer has reserved to himself the privilege
of electing between two alternative duties, and also the power, by
expressing his election to fix the right of the insured and his own
duty, and likewise to extinguish his own privilege of election.
Such a relinquishment of a privilege of election may very properly
be called a waiver." 25
That .is bothersome. A privilege to elect between two things
is a power to extinguish the privilege; the privilege is extinguished
by its exercise; and the exercise of the privilege having extin-
guished it,
"such a relinquishment of a privilege of election may very prop-
erly be called a waiver."
That is very bothersome. The case is a clear one of election be-
tween two permitted alternatives; and I gladly, almost triumph-
antly, note that the Professor does not approve of the suggestion
that,
"by election to do either one, the insurer 'waives his right' to do
the other."
Just as, similarly, when you elect to. take the horse, you do not
waive your right to the mule. I thought so.
The foregoing analysis has, I think, satisfactorily demonstrated
that, omitting case 8 as of no present relevancy, the other
ten cases are about equally divided between contract and election.
Introduction of notions about waiver is not only confusing but
24 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 849.
25 Vance, ip. cit. supra note 2, at 849 and 850.
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erroneous. Any other eleven cases can as easily be assigned to
one of these departments, or to estoppel or release. All that is
needed is accuracy in the use of language.
Observations upon two unattached points may be added.
1. In his article, the Professor says : -'
"This discussion makes it clear that a waiver is conventional
in its nature, often taking the form of a true contract.'
If in its nature waiver is conventional, what are the characteris-
tics which distinguish it, or, in that view, can distinguish it
from contract? In cases 6 and 7--cases of pure election-the
Professor gives us examples of what he calls "proper waivers."
But in these there is no trace of convention, and he assigns to
them their peculiar designation only because "there is no other
term that is adequately descriptive." 27
2. Again, the Professor says :2
"It will be found that however uncertain the meaning of the
word waiver, and however many varying concepts it may include,
it is nevertheless a useful term, connoting a group of legal rela-
tionships that have many incidents in common."
According to the definition accepted by the Professor, waiver is a
simple enough concept. It is merely "an intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right." 20 And now we are told that it may in-
clude "many varying concepts." Waiver, moreover, by the
definition, is an activity, and, if so, how can the word "connote"
(mean or signify) "a group of legal relationships"? If the Pro-
fessor means that waiver is to be found operating in certain
"groups," he might have helped us by specifying the groups and
the common incidents. In his eleven cases, he does not even
furnish illustration of what he means, for while he says (quite
inaccurately, as I think) that their various legal relationships
"exhibit a common character," he adds (inconsistently, as I
think) thatl °
"differentiating legal relationships cast them into several quite
distinct classes."
Once more, if it be true that the waiver cases are those which
"have many incidents in common," the Professor nevertheless ap-
pears to be of the opinion that the group may contain cases exhibit-
ing fundamental dissimilarity. There are, for example, waivers
which are "inoperative without a consideration.' 3, There are
other waivers which need "no consideration." 3- And in a single
26 Vance, op. cit. sumpra note 2, at 856.27Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 847.
2-8 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 840 and 841.29 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 846.
^o Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 846.
s1 Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 851.
321bid.
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class of waivers-those, pre-eminently ranked as "proper
waivers"--there is "serious difficulty," for,
"in cases (4) and (5) a consideration is clearly present, but none
exists in cases (6) and (7)." 83
We are a long way from our simple concept of "intentional relin-
quishment." And I am still in search of some intelligible defini-
tion of waiver; of some idea what it is; and of the rules under
which it operates.
Epilogue. As an exposition of the decisions as they stood,
Professor Vance's book must have been of great value to the pro-
fession. I should like to see in a second edition devotion rather
to the enlightenment of the courts. For the law is in frightful
disorder, as the Professor quite recognizes. Reconciliation, not
merely of the conflicting opinions but of the conflicting ideas un-
derlying them, is impossible. Nothing short of sweeping the
whole thing away and commencing anew can be useful. And
in reconstruction there must be no place for foolish notions
about forfeiture and waiver which, in very large measure, are
responsible for the mess. My reforming efforts failed. Pos-
sibly Professor Vance may succeed. But the task is difficult. It
might take more than two dogs to turn a buffalo stampede.
S3 Ibid.
